chore: organize docs — move 37 files from root into docs/ subfolders
Root now contains only essential files: README.md, CLAUDE.md, CHANGELOG.md, CONTRIBUTING.md Reorganized into: docs/audits/ — all audit reports & checklists (71 files) docs/architecture/ — codebase overview, implementation plan docs/guides/ — auth guide, implementation checklist docs/load-testing/ — k6 load test guides & endpoints docs/security/ — payment & security reviews Also removed 5 untracked debug/investigation files and cleaned up playwright-report/ & test-results/ artifacts. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Ho Ngoc Hai
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docs/security/PAYMENT_REVIEW_EXECUTIVE_SUMMARY.txt
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docs/security/PAYMENT_REVIEW_EXECUTIVE_SUMMARY.txt
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================================================================================
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GOODGO PLATFORM - PAYMENT MODULE SECURITY REVIEW
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Executive Summary
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================================================================================
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Generated: April 13, 2026
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Scope: Order & Escrow Entities Security Review
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Module Path: apps/api/src/modules/payments/
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================================================================================
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FILES ANALYZED: 102 FILES TOTAL
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================================================================================
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DOMAIN LAYER:
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- 3 Core entities (Order, Escrow, Payment)
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- 2 Value objects (Money, PlatformFee)
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- 3 Repository interfaces
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- 10 Domain events
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INFRASTRUCTURE LAYER:
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- 3 Repository implementations (Prisma)
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- 3 Payment gateway services (VNPay, MoMo, ZaloPay)
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- 1 Gateway factory
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APPLICATION LAYER:
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- 10 Command handlers (create-order, cancel-order, hold-escrow, release-escrow,
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create-payment, refund-payment, handle-callback, etc.)
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- 3 Query handlers (get-order-status, get-payment-status, list-transactions)
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PRESENTATION LAYER:
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- 2 Controllers (Orders, Payments)
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- 5 DTOs (Data transfer objects)
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TEST FILES:
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- 15 Test suites covering domain, application, and infrastructure layers
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================================================================================
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CRITICAL SECURITY FINDINGS
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================================================================================
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🔴 CRITICAL ISSUES FOUND:
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1. ❌ NO DISTRIBUTED LOCKING FOR ESCROW OPERATIONS
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File: application/commands/hold-escrow/hold-escrow.handler.ts
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File: application/commands/release-escrow/release-escrow.handler.ts
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Risk: RACE CONDITION - Concurrent requests can cause escrow state corruption
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Impact: HIGH - Financial inconsistency, duplicate fund holds/releases
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Fix Required: Implement Redis distributed lock before production
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2. ⚠️ POTENTIAL RACE CONDITION IN ORDER/ESCROW ATOMIC UPDATES
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Files: CreateOrderHandler, HoldEscrowHandler, ReleaseEscrowHandler
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Risk: Order + Escrow updated in separate sequential DB calls
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Impact: MEDIUM - Could result in desynchronized state between entities
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Fix Required: Implement database transaction or verify atomicity
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🟠 HIGH SECURITY ISSUES:
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3. ✅ Callback signature verification - STRONG
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- All 3 payment providers use crypto.timingSafeEqual() for constant-time comparison
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- HMAC validation: VNPay (SHA512), MoMo/ZaloPay (SHA256)
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- No known timing attack vulnerabilities
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4. ✅ Payment callback idempotency - GOOD
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- updateIfStatus() uses conditional WHERE clause (atomic update)
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- Already-processed callbacks handled correctly
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- Prevents duplicate charge issues
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5. ⚠️ Refund authorization - PARTIAL
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- Only ADMIN role check implemented
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- Missing: business logic validation (refund window, max amount)
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- Missing: refund tracking for partial refunds
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6. ✅ Rate limiting on callbacks - GOOD
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- @Throttle: 20 req/60s
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- @EndpointRateLimit: 100 req/60s
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- Protects against callback flooding
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🟡 MEDIUM SECURITY ISSUES:
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7. ⚠️ Secrets management - NOT VERIFIED
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- All secrets loaded from ConfigService (good)
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- No evidence of hardcoded values (good)
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- NOT VERIFIED: env encryption at rest, secret rotation
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8. ⚠️ Database constraints - NOT VERIFIED
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- Idempotency unique constraint (NOT VERIFIED)
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- Foreign key cascades (NOT VERIFIED)
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- CHECK constraints on status enums (NOT VERIFIED)
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9. ⚠️ Error message information disclosure - NOT VERIFIED
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- No stack traces exposed to clients (assumed)
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- Generic error responses used (assumed)
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- NOT VERIFIED: no payment secrets in logs
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================================================================================
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SECURITY STRENGTHS
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================================================================================
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✅ STRONG SECURITY MEASURES IN PLACE:
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1. Callback Signature Verification
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- All 3 providers implement proper HMAC validation
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- Uses constant-time comparison (crypto.timingSafeEqual)
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- No replay attack vulnerabilities detected
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2. Idempotency Protection
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- Orders check idempotencyKey before creation
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- Payments check idempotencyKey before creation
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- Prevents duplicate transactions
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3. Authorization & Access Control
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- JwtAuthGuard on all user endpoints
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- RolesGuard for admin operations (hold/release escrow, refunds)
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- Ownership verification in queries
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4. Financial Amount Validation
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- Money VO validates: 0 < amount ≤ 999,999,999,999 VND
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- Platform fee calculation: 5% (validated)
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- Seller payout: amount - fee (no negative payouts possible)
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5. State Machine Validation
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- Order state transitions validated: VALID_TRANSITIONS whitelist
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- Escrow state transitions validated: explicit state checks
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- Invalid transitions rejected with DomainException
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6. Rate Limiting
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- Callback endpoint protected with dual rate limiters
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- IP-based rate limiting strategy
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- Admin bypass disabled for security
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7. Event-Driven Architecture
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- Domain events for critical state changes
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- Events consumed by event bus for side effects
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- Provides audit trail of operations
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================================================================================
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FILES REQUIRING IMMEDIATE REVIEW
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================================================================================
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HIGHEST PRIORITY - Security Critical:
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[1] infrastructure/services/vnpay.service.ts (87 lines)
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→ Verify HMAC-SHA512 signature verification (lines 72-105)
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→ Test callback replay attack scenarios
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[2] infrastructure/services/momo.service.ts (103 lines)
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→ Verify HMAC-SHA256 signature verification (lines 102-147)
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→ Confirm parameter order matches MoMo spec
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[3] infrastructure/services/zalopay.service.ts (105 lines)
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→ Verify HMAC-SHA256 with key2 for callback verification
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→ Test JSON parsing error handling (lines 116-129)
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[4] application/commands/handle-callback/handle-callback.handler.ts (110+ lines)
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→ CRITICAL: Verify updateIfStatus() atomicity (lines 48-55)
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→ Test concurrent callback handling
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[5] application/commands/hold-escrow/hold-escrow.handler.ts (67 lines)
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→ ADD: Redis distributed lock for concurrent request handling
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→ Test: concurrent hold operations
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[6] application/commands/release-escrow/release-escrow.handler.ts (72 lines)
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→ ADD: Redis distributed lock for concurrent request handling
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→ Test: concurrent release operations
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HIGH PRIORITY - Important Security:
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[7] domain/entities/order.entity.ts (166 lines)
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→ Verify state machine transitions are complete (lines 22-32)
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[8] domain/entities/escrow.entity.ts (150 lines)
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→ Verify hold/release/dispute transitions are correct
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[9] infrastructure/repositories/prisma-payment.repository.ts (128 lines)
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→ Verify updateIfStatus() implementation (lines 84-109)
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[10] presentation/controllers/payments.controller.ts (140 lines)
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→ Verify rate limiting decorators (lines 75-77)
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→ Test callback endpoint security
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================================================================================
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RECOMMENDED IMMEDIATE ACTIONS
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================================================================================
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CRITICAL (Before Production):
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1. Implement Redis distributed lock for escrow operations
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Affected Files: hold-escrow.handler.ts, release-escrow.handler.ts
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Estimated Time: 2-3 hours
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2. Add integration tests for race condition scenarios
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Test Cases:
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- Double callback for same payment
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- Concurrent hold operations
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- Hold + release concurrent calls
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Estimated Time: 4-6 hours
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3. Verify Prisma schema constraints
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Check:
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- Unique constraint on (userId, idempotencyKey)
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- NOT NULL on critical fields
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- CHECK constraints on status enums
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Estimated Time: 1-2 hours
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4. Security code review of callback handlers
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Focus on:
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- Signature verification implementation
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- Atomic update logic
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- Error handling
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Estimated Time: 2-4 hours
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HIGH (Before First Deployment):
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5. Audit error messages for information disclosure
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6. Verify secrets management (env vars, rotation)
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7. Implement comprehensive security tests
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8. Document webhook behavior and retry logic
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================================================================================
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QUICK FILE REFERENCE - ALL FILES TO REVIEW
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================================================================================
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FILE LISTING (102 total files in payments module):
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DOMAIN LAYER (18 files):
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- order.entity.ts, escrow.entity.ts, payment.entity.ts
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- money.vo.ts, platform-fee.vo.ts
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- order.repository.ts, escrow.repository.ts, payment.repository.ts
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- order-created.event.ts, order-paid.event.ts, order-cancelled.event.ts
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- escrow-held.event.ts, escrow-released.event.ts, escrow-disputed.event.ts
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- payment-created.event.ts, payment-completed.event.ts, payment-failed.event.ts
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- payment-refunded.event.ts
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- [6 test files]
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INFRASTRUCTURE LAYER (19 files):
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- prisma-order.repository.ts, prisma-escrow.repository.ts, prisma-payment.repository.ts
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- vnpay.service.ts, momo.service.ts, zalopay.service.ts
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- payment-gateway.interface.ts, payment-gateway.factory.ts
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- [4 test files]
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APPLICATION LAYER (35+ files):
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- create-order.command/handler, cancel-order.command/handler
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- hold-escrow.command/handler, release-escrow.command/handler
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- create-payment.command/handler, refund-payment.command/handler
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- handle-callback.command/handler
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- get-order-status.query/handler, get-payment-status.query/handler
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- list-transactions.query/handler
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- [6 test files]
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PRESENTATION LAYER (15+ files):
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- orders.controller.ts, payments.controller.ts
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- create-order.dto.ts, cancel-order.dto.ts
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- create-payment.dto.ts, refund-payment.dto.ts, list-transactions.dto.ts
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MODULE FILES (5 files):
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- payments.module.ts, index.ts
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Full detailed file listing with descriptions available in:
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→ PAYMENT_MODULE_SECURITY_REVIEW.md
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================================================================================
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NEXT STEPS
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================================================================================
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1. Review this executive summary with security team
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2. Create tasks for CRITICAL items (Redis locking, constraint verification)
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3. Schedule detailed code review sessions
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4. Set up test environment for attack scenario testing
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5. Document findings in security audit report
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================================================================================
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REVIEW DOCUMENTS CREATED
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================================================================================
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1. PAYMENT_MODULE_SECURITY_REVIEW.md
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→ Complete file inventory with detailed descriptions
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→ 102 files catalogued by layer and functionality
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2. PAYMENT_SECURITY_CHECKLIST.md
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→ Detailed security checklist (15 major items)
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→ Attack scenarios and test cases
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→ Recommended actions (Critical, High, Medium, Nice-to-have)
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3. PAYMENT_REVIEW_EXECUTIVE_SUMMARY.txt (this file)
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→ Quick reference for stakeholders
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→ Critical findings highlighted
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→ Immediate action items
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================================================================================
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