feat(agents): consolidate getDashboard into single aggregate SQL query

Replaces 7 separate Prisma/DB round-trips (findUniqueOrThrow + groupBy + 2x inquiry.count + 2x listing.count + review.aggregate) with a single parameterised CTE query via \$queryRaw. Response shape is unchanged. - Adds AgentStatsRow interface for typed raw result - Removes now-unused getInquiryStats / getListingStats private helpers - Updates test to mock \$queryRaw; adds "agent not found" error path test - All agents tests pass (35 tests, pre-existing env-secret failure skipped) Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
feat(auth): GOO-237 ship dual-key JWT verification for zero-downtime secret rotation
2026-04-24 14:03:08 +07:00 · 2026-04-24 13:59:21 +07:00
9 changed files with 586 additions and 107 deletions
--- a/apps/api/package.json
+++ b/apps/api/package.json
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
    "handlebars": "^4.7.9",
    "helmet": "^8.1.0",
    "ioredis": "^5.4.0",
+    "jsonwebtoken": "^9.0.3",
    "nodemailer": "^8.0.5",
    "otplib": "^13.4.0",
    "passport": "^0.7.0",
@@ -76,6 +77,7 @@
    "@types/bcrypt": "^6.0.0",
    "@types/cookie-parser": "^1.4.10",
    "@types/express": "^5.0.0",
+    "@types/jsonwebtoken": "^9.0.10",
    "@types/node": "^25.5.2",
    "@types/nodemailer": "^8.0.0",
    "@types/passport-google-oauth20": "^2.0.17",
--- a/apps/api/src/modules/agents/infrastructure/tests/prisma-agent.repository.spec.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/modules/agents/infrastructure/tests/prisma-agent.repository.spec.ts
@@ -5,16 +5,12 @@ import { PrismaAgentRepository } from '../repositories/prisma-agent.repository';
 describe('PrismaAgentRepository', () => {
  let repository: PrismaAgentRepository;
  let mockPrisma: {
+    $queryRaw: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
    agent: {
      findUnique: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
-      findUniqueOrThrow: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
      update: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
    };
    lead: {
-      groupBy: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
-      count: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
-    };
-    inquiry: {
      count: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
    };
    listing: {
@@ -43,16 +39,12 @@ describe('PrismaAgentRepository', () => {

  beforeEach(() => {
    mockPrisma = {
+      $queryRaw: vi.fn(),
      agent: {
        findUnique: vi.fn(),
-        findUniqueOrThrow: vi.fn(),
        update: vi.fn(),
      },
      lead: {
-        groupBy: vi.fn(),
-        count: vi.fn(),
-      },
-      inquiry: {
        count: vi.fn(),
      },
      listing: {
@@ -198,32 +190,31 @@ describe('PrismaAgentRepository', () => {
  });

  describe('getDashboard', () => {
-    it('returns full dashboard data', async () => {
-      mockPrisma.agent.findUniqueOrThrow.mockResolvedValue({
-        id: 'agent-1',
-        qualityScore: 85,
-        totalDeals: 12,
-        responseTimeAvg: 600,
-        isVerified: true,
-      });
-      mockPrisma.lead.groupBy.mockResolvedValue([
-        { status: 'NEW', _count: { id: 5 } },
-        { status: 'CONTACTED', _count: { id: 10 } },
-        { status: 'CONVERTED', _count: { id: 3 } },
-      ]);
-      mockPrisma.inquiry.count
-        .mockResolvedValueOnce(45) // total
-        .mockResolvedValueOnce(3); // unread
-      mockPrisma.listing.count
-        .mockResolvedValueOnce(15) // total
-        .mockResolvedValueOnce(10); // active
-      mockPrisma.review.aggregate.mockResolvedValue({
-        _avg: { rating: 4.5 },
-        _count: { rating: 20 },
-      });
+    const mockStatsRow = {
+      agentId: 'agent-1',
+      qualityScore: 85,
+      totalDeals: 12,
+      responseTimeAvg: 600,
+      isVerified: true,
+      leadsByStatus: { NEW: 5, CONTACTED: 10, CONVERTED: 3 },
+      totalLeads: 18,
+      convertedLeads: 3,
+      totalListings: 15,
+      activeListings: 10,
+      totalInquiries: 45,
+      unreadInquiries: 3,
+      avgRating: 4.5,
+      totalReviews: 20,
+    };
+
+    it('returns full dashboard data using single aggregate query', async () => {
+      mockPrisma.$queryRaw.mockResolvedValue([mockStatsRow]);

      const result = await repository.getDashboard('agent-1');

+      // Verify single DB call
+      expect(mockPrisma.$queryRaw).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+
      expect(result.agentId).toBe('agent-1');
      expect(result.qualityScore).toBe(85);
      expect(result.totalDeals).toBe(12);
@@ -240,21 +231,23 @@ describe('PrismaAgentRepository', () => {
      expect(result.totalReviews).toBe(20);
    });

-    it('handles agent with zero leads', async () => {
-      mockPrisma.agent.findUniqueOrThrow.mockResolvedValue({
-        id: 'agent-1',
+    it('handles agent with zero leads and reviews', async () => {
+      mockPrisma.$queryRaw.mockResolvedValue([{
+        ...mockStatsRow,
        qualityScore: 0,
        totalDeals: 0,
        responseTimeAvg: null,
        isVerified: false,
-      });
-      mockPrisma.lead.groupBy.mockResolvedValue([]);
-      mockPrisma.inquiry.count.mockResolvedValue(0);
-      mockPrisma.listing.count.mockResolvedValue(0);
-      mockPrisma.review.aggregate.mockResolvedValue({
-        _avg: { rating: null },
-        _count: { rating: 0 },
-      });
+        leadsByStatus: {},
+        totalLeads: 0,
+        convertedLeads: 0,
+        totalListings: 0,
+        activeListings: 0,
+        totalInquiries: 0,
+        unreadInquiries: 0,
+        avgRating: 0,
+        totalReviews: 0,
+      }]);

      const result = await repository.getDashboard('agent-1');

@@ -264,6 +257,14 @@ describe('PrismaAgentRepository', () => {
      expect(result.avgReviewRating).toBe(0);
      expect(result.totalReviews).toBe(0);
    });
+
+    it('throws when agent not found (empty result set)', async () => {
+      mockPrisma.$queryRaw.mockResolvedValue([]);
+
+      await expect(repository.getDashboard('nonexistent')).rejects.toThrow(
+        'Agent not found: nonexistent',
+      );
+    });
  });

  describe('getPublicProfile', () => {
--- a/apps/api/src/modules/agents/infrastructure/repositories/prisma-agent.repository.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/modules/agents/infrastructure/repositories/prisma-agent.repository.ts
@@ -10,6 +10,24 @@ import {
 import { QualityScore } from '../../domain/value-objects/quality-score.vo';
 import { buildPublicProfile } from './agent-profile.queries';

+/** Shape returned by the single-aggregate getDashboard SQL query. */
+interface AgentStatsRow {
+  agentId: string;
+  qualityScore: number;
+  totalDeals: number;
+  responseTimeAvg: number | null;
+  isVerified: boolean;
+  leadsByStatus: unknown;
+  totalLeads: number;
+  convertedLeads: number;
+  totalListings: number;
+  activeListings: number;
+  totalInquiries: number;
+  unreadInquiries: number;
+  avgRating: number;
+  totalReviews: number;
+}
+
@Injectable()
 export class PrismaAgentRepository implements IAgentRepository {
  constructor(private readonly prisma: PrismaService) {}
@@ -34,56 +52,104 @@ export class PrismaAgentRepository implements IAgentRepository {
  }

  async getDashboard(agentId: string): Promise<AgentDashboardData> {
-    const [agent, leads, inquiryStats, listingStats, reviewStats] =
-      await Promise.all([
-        this.prisma.agent.findUniqueOrThrow({
-          where: { id: agentId },
-          select: {
-            id: true, qualityScore: true, totalDeals: true,
-            responseTimeAvg: true, isVerified: true,
-          },
-        }),
-        this.prisma.lead.groupBy({
-          by: ['status'],
-          where: { agentId },
-          _count: { id: true },
-        }),
-        this.getInquiryStats(agentId),
-        this.getListingStats(agentId),
-        this.prisma.review.aggregate({
-          where: { targetType: 'AGENT', targetId: agentId },
-          _avg: { rating: true },
-          _count: { rating: true },
-        }),
-      ]);
+    // Single aggregate query — replaces 7 separate round-trips.
+    const rows = await this.prisma.$queryRaw<AgentStatsRow[]>`
+      WITH
+        agent_base AS (
+          SELECT
+            id,
+            "qualityScore",
+            "totalDeals",
+            "responseTimeAvg",
+            "isVerified"
+          FROM "Agent"
+          WHERE id = ${agentId}
+        ),
+        lead_stats AS (
+          SELECT
+            status,
+            COUNT(*)::int AS cnt
+          FROM "Lead"
+          WHERE "agentId" = ${agentId}
+          GROUP BY status
+        ),
+        listing_agg AS (
+          SELECT
+            COUNT(*)::int                                        AS total_listings,
+            COUNT(*) FILTER (WHERE status = 'ACTIVE')::int      AS active_listings
+          FROM "Listing"
+          WHERE "agentId" = ${agentId}
+        ),
+        inquiry_agg AS (
+          SELECT
+            COUNT(*)::int                                            AS total_inquiries,
+            COUNT(*) FILTER (WHERE i."isRead" = false)::int         AS unread_inquiries
+          FROM "Inquiry" i
+          JOIN "Listing" l ON l.id = i."listingId"
+          WHERE l."agentId" = ${agentId}
+        ),
+        review_agg AS (
+          SELECT
+            COALESCE(AVG(rating), 0)::float  AS avg_rating,
+            COUNT(*)::int                    AS total_reviews
+          FROM "Review"
+          WHERE "targetType" = 'AGENT'
+            AND "targetId" = ${agentId}
+        )
+      SELECT
+        a.id                                            AS "agentId",
+        a."qualityScore",
+        a."totalDeals",
+        a."responseTimeAvg",
+        a."isVerified",
+        COALESCE(
+          (SELECT jsonb_object_agg(status, cnt) FROM lead_stats),
+          '{}'::jsonb
+        )                                               AS "leadsByStatus",
+        COALESCE(
+          (SELECT SUM(cnt)::int FROM lead_stats),
+          0
+        )                                               AS "totalLeads",
+        COALESCE(
+          (SELECT cnt FROM lead_stats WHERE status = 'CONVERTED'),
+          0
+        )                                               AS "convertedLeads",
+        la.total_listings                               AS "totalListings",
+        la.active_listings                              AS "activeListings",
+        ia.total_inquiries                              AS "totalInquiries",
+        ia.unread_inquiries                             AS "unreadInquiries",
+        ra.avg_rating                                   AS "avgRating",
+        ra.total_reviews                                AS "totalReviews"
+      FROM agent_base a
+      CROSS JOIN listing_agg la
+      CROSS JOIN inquiry_agg ia
+      CROSS JOIN review_agg ra
+    `;

-    const leadsByStatus: Record<string, number> = {};
-    let totalLeads = 0;
-    let convertedLeads = 0;
-
-    for (const group of leads) {
-      leadsByStatus[group.status] = group._count.id;
-      totalLeads += group._count.id;
-      if (group.status === 'CONVERTED') convertedLeads = group._count.id;
+    if (rows.length === 0) {
+      throw new Error(`Agent not found: ${agentId}`);
    }

+    const row = rows[0]!;
+    const totalLeads = row.totalLeads ?? 0;
+    const convertedLeads = row.convertedLeads ?? 0;
    const conversionRate = totalLeads > 0 ? convertedLeads / totalLeads : 0;

    return {
-      agentId: agent.id,
-      qualityScore: agent.qualityScore,
-      totalDeals: agent.totalDeals,
-      responseTimeAvg: agent.responseTimeAvg,
-      isVerified: agent.isVerified,
+      agentId: row.agentId,
+      qualityScore: row.qualityScore,
+      totalDeals: row.totalDeals,
+      responseTimeAvg: row.responseTimeAvg,
+      isVerified: row.isVerified,
      totalLeads,
-      leadsByStatus,
+      leadsByStatus: (row.leadsByStatus as Record<string, number>) ?? {},
      conversionRate: Math.round(conversionRate * 1000) / 1000,
-      totalInquiries: inquiryStats.total,
-      unreadInquiries: inquiryStats.unread,
-      totalListings: listingStats.total,
-      activeListings: listingStats.active,
-      avgReviewRating: Math.round((reviewStats._avg.rating ?? 0) * 10) / 10,
-      totalReviews: reviewStats._count.rating,
+      totalInquiries: row.totalInquiries ?? 0,
+      unreadInquiries: row.unreadInquiries ?? 0,
+      totalListings: row.totalListings ?? 0,
+      activeListings: row.activeListings ?? 0,
+      avgReviewRating: Math.round((row.avgRating ?? 0) * 10) / 10,
+      totalReviews: row.totalReviews ?? 0,
    };
  }

@@ -125,26 +191,6 @@ export class PrismaAgentRepository implements IAgentRepository {
    };
  }

-  private async getInquiryStats(
-    agentId: string,
-  ): Promise<{ total: number; unread: number }> {
-    const [total, unread] = await Promise.all([
-      this.prisma.inquiry.count({ where: { listing: { agentId } } }),
-      this.prisma.inquiry.count({ where: { listing: { agentId }, isRead: false } }),
-    ]);
-    return { total, unread };
-  }
-
-  private async getListingStats(
-    agentId: string,
-  ): Promise<{ total: number; active: number }> {
-    const [total, active] = await Promise.all([
-      this.prisma.listing.count({ where: { agentId } }),
-      this.prisma.listing.count({ where: { agentId, status: 'ACTIVE' } }),
-    ]);
-    return { total, active };
-  }
-
  private toDomain(row: {
    id: string;
    userId: string;
--- a/apps/api/src/modules/auth/infrastructure/tests/jwt.strategy.spec.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/modules/auth/infrastructure/tests/jwt.strategy.spec.ts
@@ -28,6 +28,11 @@ vi.mock('@modules/shared', () => ({
  RedisService: class {},
 }));

+// Mock jsonwebtoken so we can control which secret succeeds
+vi.mock('jsonwebtoken', () => ({
+  verify: vi.fn(),
+}));
+
 type PrismaStub = { user: { findUnique: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn> } };
 type RedisStub = {
  isAvailable: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
@@ -218,3 +223,118 @@ describe('JwtStrategy', () => {
    ).rejects.toMatchObject({ status: 401 });
  });
 });
+
+describe('JwtStrategy dual-key (secretOrKeyProvider)', () => {
+  afterEach(() => {
+    vi.unstubAllEnvs();
+    vi.resetModules();
+    vi.clearAllMocks();
+  });
+
+  it('uses secretOrKeyProvider instead of secretOrKey', async () => {
+    vi.stubEnv('JWT_SECRET', 'primary-secret-at-least-32-chars');
+    const { JwtStrategy } = await import('../strategies/jwt.strategy');
+    const strategy = new JwtStrategy(makePrisma(ACTIVE_USER) as never, makeRedis() as never);
+
+    const options = (strategy as any)._options;
+    expect(options.secretOrKeyProvider).toBeDefined();
+    expect(options.secretOrKey).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('secretOrKeyProvider returns primary secret when primary verification succeeds', async () => {
+    vi.stubEnv('JWT_SECRET', 'primary-secret-at-least-32-chars');
+    delete process.env['JWT_SECRET_PREVIOUS'];
+
+    const { verify } = await import('jsonwebtoken');
+    const mockVerify = vi.mocked(verify);
+    mockVerify.mockReturnValueOnce({} as any);
+
+    const { JwtStrategy } = await import('../strategies/jwt.strategy');
+    const strategy = new JwtStrategy(makePrisma(ACTIVE_USER) as never, makeRedis() as never);
+
+    const options = (strategy as any)._options;
+    const result = await new Promise<string>((resolve, reject) => {
+      options.secretOrKeyProvider({} as any, 'some-jwt-token', (err: Error | null, secret?: string) => {
+        if (err) reject(err);
+        else resolve(secret!);
+      });
+    });
+
+    expect(result).toBe('primary-secret-at-least-32-chars');
+  });
+
+  it('secretOrKeyProvider falls back to previous secret when primary fails', async () => {
+    vi.stubEnv('JWT_SECRET', 'primary-secret-at-least-32-chars');
+    vi.stubEnv('JWT_SECRET_PREVIOUS', 'previous-secret-at-least-32-chars');
+
+    const { verify } = await import('jsonwebtoken');
+    const mockVerify = vi.mocked(verify);
+    mockVerify.mockImplementationOnce(() => {
+      throw new Error('invalid signature');
+    });
+    mockVerify.mockReturnValueOnce({} as any);
+
+    const { JwtStrategy } = await import('../strategies/jwt.strategy');
+    const strategy = new JwtStrategy(makePrisma(ACTIVE_USER) as never, makeRedis() as never);
+
+    const options = (strategy as any)._options;
+    const result = await new Promise<string>((resolve, reject) => {
+      options.secretOrKeyProvider({} as any, 'old-jwt-token', (err: Error | null, secret?: string) => {
+        if (err) reject(err);
+        else resolve(secret!);
+      });
+    });
+
+    expect(result).toBe('previous-secret-at-least-32-chars');
+  });
+
+  it('secretOrKeyProvider returns primary when both keys fail (passport will 401)', async () => {
+    vi.stubEnv('JWT_SECRET', 'primary-secret-at-least-32-chars');
+    vi.stubEnv('JWT_SECRET_PREVIOUS', 'previous-secret-at-least-32-chars');
+
+    const { verify } = await import('jsonwebtoken');
+    const mockVerify = vi.mocked(verify);
+    mockVerify.mockImplementation(() => {
+      throw new Error('invalid signature');
+    });
+
+    const { JwtStrategy } = await import('../strategies/jwt.strategy');
+    const strategy = new JwtStrategy(makePrisma(ACTIVE_USER) as never, makeRedis() as never);
+
+    const options = (strategy as any)._options;
+    const result = await new Promise<string>((resolve, reject) => {
+      options.secretOrKeyProvider({} as any, 'bad-jwt-token', (err: Error | null, secret?: string) => {
+        if (err) reject(err);
+        else resolve(secret!);
+      });
+    });
+
+    expect(result).toBe('primary-secret-at-least-32-chars');
+  });
+
+  it('secretOrKeyProvider skips fallback when no previous secret is configured', async () => {
+    vi.stubEnv('JWT_SECRET', 'primary-secret-at-least-32-chars');
+    delete process.env['JWT_SECRET_PREVIOUS'];
+
+    const { verify } = await import('jsonwebtoken');
+    const mockVerify = vi.mocked(verify);
+    mockVerify.mockImplementation(() => {
+      throw new Error('invalid signature');
+    });
+
+    const { JwtStrategy } = await import('../strategies/jwt.strategy');
+    const strategy = new JwtStrategy(makePrisma(ACTIVE_USER) as never, makeRedis() as never);
+
+    const options = (strategy as any)._options;
+    const result = await new Promise<string>((resolve, reject) => {
+      options.secretOrKeyProvider({} as any, 'bad-jwt-token', (err: Error | null, secret?: string) => {
+        if (err) reject(err);
+        else resolve(secret!);
+      });
+    });
+
+    expect(result).toBe('primary-secret-at-least-32-chars');
+    // verify called only once — no fallback attempted
+    expect(mockVerify).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+});
--- a/apps/api/src/modules/auth/infrastructure/strategies/jwt.strategy.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/modules/auth/infrastructure/strategies/jwt.strategy.ts
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 import { Injectable, UnauthorizedException } from '@nestjs/common';
 import { PassportStrategy } from '@nestjs/passport';
 import { type Request } from 'express';
+import { verify as jwtVerify } from 'jsonwebtoken';
 import { ExtractJwt, Strategy } from 'passport-jwt';
 // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/consistent-type-imports -- NestJS DI requires value imports for emitDecoratorMetadata
 import { PrismaService, RedisService } from '@modules/shared';
@@ -26,6 +27,42 @@ export const USER_STATUS_CACHE_PREFIX = 'auth:user_status:v1';
 /** TTL for cached user status (seconds). */
 export const USER_STATUS_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS = 60;

+/**
+ * Builds a `secretOrKeyProvider` callback for passport-jwt that tries the
+ * primary secret first, then falls back to an optional previous secret.
+ * This enables zero-downtime JWT secret rotation: tokens signed with the
+ * old key remain valid during the grace period.
+ *
+ * When only the primary secret is configured (no `_PREVIOUS` env var),
+ * the behaviour is identical to the original `secretOrKey` approach.
+ */
+export function makeSecretOrKeyProvider(
+  primarySecret: string,
+  previousSecret: string | undefined,
+): (request: Request, rawJwtToken: string, done: (err: Error | null, secret?: string) => void) => void {
+  return (_request: Request, rawJwtToken: string, done: (err: Error | null, secret?: string) => void) => {
+    // Fast path: try primary first (the common case after rotation completes).
+    try {
+      jwtVerify(rawJwtToken, primarySecret, { audience: 'goodgo-api', issuer: 'goodgo-platform' });
+      return done(null, primarySecret);
+    } catch {
+      // Primary failed — try previous if configured.
+    }
+
+    if (previousSecret) {
+      try {
+        jwtVerify(rawJwtToken, previousSecret, { audience: 'goodgo-api', issuer: 'goodgo-platform' });
+        return done(null, previousSecret);
+      } catch {
+        // Both keys failed — fall through to let passport return 401.
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Return the primary so passport-jwt produces its standard error.
+    return done(null, primarySecret);
+  };
+}
+
@Injectable()
 export class JwtStrategy extends PassportStrategy(Strategy) {
  constructor(
@@ -37,10 +74,12 @@ export class JwtStrategy extends PassportStrategy(Strategy) {
      throw new Error('JWT_SECRET environment variable is required');
    }

+    const previousSecret = process.env['JWT_SECRET_PREVIOUS'] || undefined;
+
    super({
      jwtFromRequest: extractJwtFromCookieOrHeader,
      ignoreExpiration: false,
-      secretOrKey: jwtSecret,
+      secretOrKeyProvider: makeSecretOrKeyProvider(jwtSecret, previousSecret),
      audience: 'goodgo-api',
      issuer: 'goodgo-platform',
    });
--- a/apps/api/src/modules/shared/infrastructure/tests/env-validation.spec.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/modules/shared/infrastructure/tests/env-validation.spec.ts
@@ -145,4 +145,52 @@ describe('validateEnv', () => {

    expect(() => validateEnv()).not.toThrow();
  });
+
+  describe('optional previous secrets (JWT_SECRET_PREVIOUS / JWT_REFRESH_SECRET_PREVIOUS)', () => {
+    it('accepts when previous secrets are not set (no rotation in progress)', () => {
+      setValidJwtSecrets();
+      delete process.env['JWT_SECRET_PREVIOUS'];
+      delete process.env['JWT_REFRESH_SECRET_PREVIOUS'];
+
+      expect(() => validateEnv()).not.toThrow();
+    });
+
+    it('accepts valid JWT_SECRET_PREVIOUS', () => {
+      setValidJwtSecrets();
+      process.env['JWT_SECRET_PREVIOUS'] = 'a-valid-previous-secret-with-at-least-32-characters';
+
+      expect(() => validateEnv()).not.toThrow();
+    });
+
+    it('rejects JWT_SECRET_PREVIOUS when it is a placeholder', () => {
+      setValidJwtSecrets();
+      process.env['JWT_SECRET_PREVIOUS'] = 'CHANGE_ME';
+
+      expect(() => validateEnv()).toThrow('Insecure JWT secret configuration');
+      expect(() => validateEnv()).toThrow('JWT_SECRET_PREVIOUS');
+    });
+
+    it('rejects JWT_SECRET_PREVIOUS when it is too short', () => {
+      setValidJwtSecrets();
+      process.env['JWT_SECRET_PREVIOUS'] = 'short';
+
+      expect(() => validateEnv()).toThrow('too short');
+    });
+
+    it('rejects JWT_REFRESH_SECRET_PREVIOUS when it is a placeholder', () => {
+      setValidJwtSecrets();
+      process.env['JWT_REFRESH_SECRET_PREVIOUS'] = 'password';
+
+      expect(() => validateEnv()).toThrow('Insecure JWT secret configuration');
+      expect(() => validateEnv()).toThrow('JWT_REFRESH_SECRET_PREVIOUS');
+    });
+
+    it('accepts both previous secrets when valid', () => {
+      setValidJwtSecrets();
+      process.env['JWT_SECRET_PREVIOUS'] = 'previous-access-secret-at-least-32-chars-long!!';
+      process.env['JWT_REFRESH_SECRET_PREVIOUS'] = 'previous-refresh-secret-at-least-32-chars-long!!';
+
+      expect(() => validateEnv()).not.toThrow();
+    });
+  });
 });
--- a/apps/api/src/modules/shared/infrastructure/env-validation.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/modules/shared/infrastructure/env-validation.ts
@@ -11,6 +11,18 @@ const ALWAYS_REQUIRED: readonly string[] = [
  'JWT_REFRESH_SECRET',
 ];

+/**
+ * Optional previous-generation JWT secrets used during key rotation.
+ * When set, the auth layer will accept tokens signed with either the
+ * primary or the previous key, enabling zero-downtime secret rotation.
+ * Subject to the same placeholder-rejection and minimum-length checks
+ * as the primary secrets.
+ */
+const OPTIONAL_PREVIOUS_SECRETS: readonly string[] = [
+  'JWT_SECRET_PREVIOUS',
+  'JWT_REFRESH_SECRET_PREVIOUS',
+];
+
 const REQUIRED_IN_PRODUCTION: readonly string[] = [
  'DATABASE_URL',
  'CORS_ORIGINS',
@@ -120,6 +132,19 @@ export function validateEnv(): void {
    }
  }

+  // Optional previous-generation secrets — if set, they must also pass
+  // the same strength checks. An empty/unset value is fine (no rotation
+  // in progress), but a weak value is always rejected.
+  for (const key of OPTIONAL_PREVIOUS_SECRETS) {
+    const value = process.env[key];
+    if (value) {
+      const error = validateJwtSecret(key, value);
+      if (error) {
+        secretErrors.push(error);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
  if (secretErrors.length > 0) {
    throw new Error(
      `Insecure JWT secret configuration:\n  ${secretErrors.join('\n  ')}\n` +
--- a/docs/security/SECRET_ROTATION_POLICY.md
+++ b/docs/security/SECRET_ROTATION_POLICY.md
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+# Payment Gateway Secret Rotation Policy
+
+> **Status:** Active — GOO-197 / parent [GOO-102](/GOO/issues/GOO-102) (CLO data-security work).
+> **Owner:** Security Engineer + Platform on-call.
+> **Last reviewed:** 2026-04-24.
+
+This document is the canonical policy for rotating all secrets that gate
+access to GoodGo's payment gateways and adjacent integrations (OAuth,
+storage, webhook signing, JWT). It ships alongside the `SecretProvider`
+abstraction in
+`apps/api/src/modules/shared/domain/ports/secret-provider.port.ts` and the
+env-backed implementation in
+`apps/api/src/modules/shared/infrastructure/env-secret-provider.service.ts`.
+
+---
+
+## 1. Why rotate
+
+A stolen or leaked HMAC key for a payment gateway is the most direct path
+to financial fraud against GoodGo. Rotation reduces the **window of abuse**
+when a key is exposed (insider misuse, accidental git commit, third-party
+breach, log scraping, etc.). It also forces us to verify that every
+runtime that relies on the key can still read it — i.e. that we have not
+lost the ability to rotate.
+
+## 2. Scope (rotation-sensitive secrets)
+
+The following secrets are in scope. Each is registered with the
+`SecretProvider` by default (see `DEFAULT_REGISTERED_SECRETS`) and has a
+matching entry in `env-validation.ts`.
+
+| Secret env var                 | Purpose                         | Cadence  | Owner          |
+| ------------------------------ | ------------------------------- | -------- | -------------- |
+| `JWT_SECRET`                   | Access-token HMAC               | 90 days  | Auth           |
+| `JWT_REFRESH_SECRET`           | Refresh-token HMAC              | 90 days  | Auth           |
+| `VNPAY_HASH_SECRET`            | VNPay request/callback HMAC     | 90 days  | Payments       |
+| `MOMO_SECRET_KEY`              | MoMo request/callback HMAC      | 90 days  | Payments       |
+| `ZALOPAY_KEY1`                 | ZaloPay order signing           | 90 days  | Payments       |
+| `ZALOPAY_KEY2`                 | ZaloPay callback signing        | 90 days  | Payments       |
+| `BANK_TRANSFER_WEBHOOK_SECRET` | Bank-transfer webhook signature | 90 days  | Payments       |
+| `GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET`         | Google OAuth                    | 180 days | Auth           |
+| `ZALO_APP_SECRET`              | Zalo OAuth                      | 180 days | Auth           |
+| `ZALO_OA_ACCESS_TOKEN`         | Zalo Official Account API token | 90 days  | Notifications  |
+| `MINIO_SECRET_KEY`             | Object-storage access key       | 180 days | Platform       |
+| `FIELD_ENCRYPTION_KEY`         | At-rest PII encryption key      | annually | Platform + CLO |
+
+Secrets **not** in this table (e.g. `DATABASE_URL` password, `REDIS_HOST`)
+follow the platform-credential rotation policy and are out of scope here.
+
+## 3. Cadence and triggers
+
+- **Routine rotation:** every 90 days for HMAC/signing keys, 180 days for
+  OAuth client secrets, annually for the field-encryption key (which has
+  expensive data-rewrap implications).
+- **Event-driven rotation (always immediately):**
+  - any commit accidentally containing a real value of one of the secrets
+    above (regardless of how briefly);
+  - departure of any individual with production access to the secret store;
+  - downstream provider notification that the credential may be exposed;
+  - confirmed or strongly suspected breach of any system that handled the
+    secret in plaintext (CI runner, dev laptop, log aggregator, …).
+
+## 4. Operator workflow (env-backed backend)
+
+1. **Generate** a new high-entropy value:
+
+   ```bash
+   openssl rand -base64 48
+   ```
+
+2. **Stage the dual-key grace period.** Copy the current secret to the
+   `_PREVIOUS` variable and set the new secret as the primary:
+
+   ```bash
+   # Example for JWT_SECRET rotation:
+   JWT_SECRET_PREVIOUS=<current-value-of-JWT_SECRET>
+   JWT_SECRET=<newly-generated-value>
+   # Same pattern for JWT_REFRESH_SECRET if rotating refresh keys.
+   ```
+
+   The auth layer automatically tries the primary key first and falls
+   back to `_PREVIOUS`, so tokens signed with the old key continue to
+   validate during the grace period (≤ access-token TTL, typically 15 m).
+
+3. **Deploy** the change. On boot, every API instance logs:
+
+   ```
+   [EnvSecretProvider] Secret versions at boot: VNPAY_HASH_SECRET=2026-04-24, …
+   ```
+
+   Verify the version field matches the staged version on every instance.
+   The raw value **must never** appear in this or any other log line.
+
+4. **Smoke-test** payment flows for the rotated provider:
+   - issue one sandbox payment
+   - confirm callback verification succeeds
+   - confirm refund signing succeeds
+     Record the rotation in the security audit log
+     (`docs/security/secret-rotation-log.md` — append-only).
+
+5. **Decommission** the old credential in the gateway's merchant portal.
+
+6. **Remove the previous secret.** After the grace period (at least one
+   full access-token TTL cycle, typically 15 minutes), remove
+   `JWT_SECRET_PREVIOUS` (and/or `JWT_REFRESH_SECRET_PREVIOUS`) from the
+   environment and redeploy. This closes the dual-key window.
+
+## 5. SecretProvider abstraction (developer workflow)
+
+All new and existing code that consumes a rotation-sensitive secret MUST
+go through the `SecretProvider` port:
+
+```ts
+import { Inject, Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { SECRET_PROVIDER, type ISecretProvider } from '@modules/shared/domain/ports';
+
+@Injectable()
+export class VnpayService {
+  constructor(@Inject(SECRET_PROVIDER) private readonly secrets: ISecretProvider) {}
+
+  async sign(payload: string): Promise<string> {
+    const { value } = await this.secrets.getSecret('VNPAY_HASH_SECRET');
+    // … HMAC with `value`, never store it on `this`, never log it.
+  }
+}
+```
+
+Rules:
+
+- **Never** capture the raw value into a service field. Always re-read on
+  the request path so a rotation takes effect at the next request.
+- **Never** include `material.value` in log messages, error messages, or
+  exception payloads. `material.version` is safe to log.
+- **Never** stringify a `SecretMaterial` directly into a response body.
+- For bootstrap-only contexts where `await` is awkward, use
+  `getSecretSync` — but note that a future remote backend may throw
+  `UnsupportedSyncReadError`.
+
+## 6. Backends
+
+- **Short term — `EnvSecretProvider` (current).** Reads from `process.env`
+  via `ConfigService`. Operationally identical to the pre-existing
+  `getOrThrow('VNPAY_HASH_SECRET')` calls, but with a stable audit surface
+  (versions logged, port-based DI).
+- **Mid term — `AwsSecretsManagerSecretProvider` / `VaultSecretProvider`.**
+  Same port. Adds:
+  - automatic refresh from the remote store
+  - per-secret IAM / Vault-policy scoping
+  - native version ids (`AWSCURRENT` / `AWSPREVIOUS` etc.) surfaced as
+    `material.version`
+  - `getSecretSync` may throw `UnsupportedSyncReadError`; bootstrap
+    callers must migrate to `getSecret`.
+
+Switching backends is a one-line change in `SharedModule` (replace
+`EnvSecretProvider` with the new implementation under the
+`SECRET_PROVIDER` token). No call sites change.
+
+## 7. Logging discipline
+
+- The `EnvSecretProvider` logs only `name=version` pairs at boot.
+- The `version` is either an operator-provided `<NAME>_SECRET_VERSION` env
+  var, or a 10-char SHA-256 fingerprint of the value (40 bits of entropy;
+  non-invertible; useful for distinguishing rotations across instances).
+- Negative tests in
+  `apps/api/src/modules/shared/infrastructure/__tests__/env-secret-provider.service.spec.ts`
+  assert the raw value never appears in logger output, error messages, or
+  serialized provider state.
+- The repo also has a global `pii-masker` and `GlobalExceptionFilter` —
+  those are defence-in-depth, not the primary control. The primary control
+  is "never put the value into a string in the first place."
+
+## 8. Incident response (suspected leak)
+
+1. Open a P1 incident in `#sec-incident`. Page Security on-call.
+2. Rotate the affected secret immediately following §4 — do not wait for
+   forensic confirmation.
+3. Search logs / CI artifacts / git history for the leaked value
+   fingerprint (NOT the value itself; use `fingerprint()` from
+   `env-secret-provider.service.ts`).
+4. Coordinate with the gateway's anti-fraud team where applicable (VNPay,
+   MoMo, ZaloPay merchant support).
+5. File a post-mortem within 5 business days; update this policy if
+   process gaps were found.
+
+## 9. References
+
+- Source port: `apps/api/src/modules/shared/domain/ports/secret-provider.port.ts`
+- Env-backed impl: `apps/api/src/modules/shared/infrastructure/env-secret-provider.service.ts`
+- Env validation: `apps/api/src/modules/shared/infrastructure/env-validation.ts`
+- Negative tests: `apps/api/src/modules/shared/infrastructure/__tests__/env-secret-provider.service.spec.ts`
+- Parent issue: [GOO-102](/GOO/issues/GOO-102)
+- This issue: [GOO-197](/GOO/issues/GOO-197)
--- a/pnpm-lock.yaml
+++ b/pnpm-lock.yaml
@@ -186,6 +186,9 @@ importers:
      ioredis:
        specifier: ^5.4.0
        version: 5.10.1
+      jsonwebtoken:
+        specifier: ^9.0.3
+        version: 9.0.3
      nodemailer:
        specifier: ^8.0.5
        version: 8.0.5
@@ -259,6 +262,9 @@ importers:
      '@types/express':
        specifier: ^5.0.0
        version: 5.0.6
+      '@types/jsonwebtoken':
+        specifier: ^9.0.10
+        version: 9.0.10
      '@types/node':
        specifier: ^25.5.2
        version: 25.5.2